We investigated whether nonhuman great apes (N = 23), 2.5-year-old (N = 20), and 3-year-old children (N = 40) infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation by adapting the blicket detector paradigm for apes. We presented chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), orangutans (Pongo abelii), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and children (Homo sapiens) with a novel reward dispenser, the blicket detector. The detector was activated by inserting specific (yet randomly determined) objects, the so-called blickets. Once activated a reward was released, accompanied by lights and a short tone. Participants were shown different patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the detector. When subsequently choosing between one of the two objects to activate the detector on their own all species, except gorillas (who failed the training), took these patterns of correlation into account. In particular, apes and 2.5-year-old children ignored objects whose effect on the detector completely depended on the presence of another object. Follow-up experiments explored whether the apes and children were also able to re-evaluate evidence retrospectively. Only children (3-year-olds in particular) were able to make such retrospective inferences about causal structures from observing the effects of the experimenter's actions. Apes succeeded here only when they observed the effects of their own interventions. Together, this study provides evidence that apes, like young children, accurately infer causal structures from patterns of (co)variation and that they use this information to inform their own interventions.
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Introduction
A chimpanzee looking up at the canopy suddenly sees a group of colobus monkeys moving in the tree and feels simultaneously a gust of wind followed by a fruit falling to the ground (cf. Tomasello & Call, 1997) . Based on this observation, the chimpanzee might learn associations between the presence of monkeys, the gust of wind, and the appearance of the fruit. Detecting such spatio-temporal associations in the environment is an essential step to make causal inferences about the world. However, mere associations even while taking into account important principles such as temporal priority or spatial contiguity are not always sufficient to infer causal structures (Hume, 1748 (Hume, /2000 . For instance, based on the above observation alone, it remains ambiguous what caused the fruit to fall down (Seed & Call, 2009 ). One possibility is that the wind (W) and not the monkeys (M) caused the detachment of the fruit (F) (one-cause model: W ? F). Alternatively, the gust of wind and the moving monkeys might be independent causes of a common effect (two-cause model: W ? F M). Given the evidence, other models such as common cause and causal chain models are viable alternatives too.
Inferring causal structures in the environment based on the perceptual input is known as the causal inverse problem (Gopnik et al., 2004) . Gopnik and colleagues proposed the differentiation of substantive and formal causal assumptions that might help an organism to solve this problem. On the one hand, substantive assumptions are specific causal principles such as the temporal order of cause and effect, spatial contiguity, and generally any prior knowledge about the world that constrains possible causal structures. On the other hand, formal assumptions provide a general, content-independent tool to infer causality-based patterns of correlation. These formal assumptions help us to distinguish between causal relations and mere correlations that are caused, for instance, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.06.009 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
